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Abstract. Increased reliance on national frameworks to improve compliance with EU standards of fiscal 
soundness calls for coordination among EU member states. We focus on the rationale and forms of coordination 
among national independent fiscal institutions (IFIs). IFIs aim at strengthening governments’ incentives to 
adhere to national fiscal rules mainly through monitoring activities that provide non-partisan information on 
the conduct of fiscal policy to all stakeholders in the budget process. Such activities increase the costs of 
inadequate policies in terms of reputation loss, financing conditions, and electoral sanctions. The case for 
coordination is two-pronged. First, national IFIs are not all born equal, with questions remaining as to how some 
of them can effectively play their role. Accepting too many weak IFIs would undermine the aim of recent reforms 
to strengthen rules-based fiscal policy and bolster the stability of the euro area. Second, as national IFIs and the 
European Commission (EC) both monitor fiscal policies, disagreements could lead to cacophony and weaken 
IFIs’ impact on the public debate about fiscal policy. Thus, coordination should aim at (i) ensuring that all national 
IFIs converge to international best practice in their operations and (ii) mitigating the risk of cacophony in fiscal 
surveillance. To preserve national IFIs independence, coordination—both between the EC and IFIs and among 
the latter—should be limited to information exchanges and peer-pressure-through-emulation. A beefed-up 
European Fiscal Board would have a key role to play in facilitating such coordination. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The European Union (EU) offers a rich set of processes, procedures and central institutions 
aimed at coordinating economic policies among its member states. Since the founding 
impetus of the 1950s, deepening integration in a growing number of areas (trade, finance, 
money) has magnified the spillovers of national policies and bolstered the economies of scale 
from certain common initiatives. Although greater integration made intergovernmental 
policy coordination increasingly desirable, the absence of a political union guided by a clear 
vision never made it easier to achieve. In the end, policy coordination within the EU has been 
shaped by gradualism and a pragmatic adherence to the subsidiarity principle. The result is 
frustratingly complex, with an array of interdependent policy instruments subject to different 
approaches ranging from pure delegation to the center (e.g. monetary policy, agricultural 
policy), binding rules (e.g. fiscal policy), peer pressure stirred by time-bound benchmarks (e.g. 
structural policies), and regular consultations held in the context of surveillance.  
Since the launch of the single currency in 1999, perfecting fiscal policy coordination has 
mobilized considerable energy. The numerical rules embedded in EU law (the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Regulations 
forming the Stability and Growth Pact) have by and large failed to deliver the levels of fiscal 
discipline and stabilization required for a smooth functioning of the currency union. The two 
major reforms of fiscal governance (in 2005 and 2010) were well-intended but did not help 
enough, leaving the framework hopelessly complicated (e.g. Debrun and Jonung, 2019; and 
Deroose et al. 2018), and in urgent need of a third reform (e.g. Bénassy-Quéré et al. , 2018; 
or Christofzik et al., 2018). 
That said, a critical and promising dimension of the 2010 amendments to fiscal governance 
was an increased reliance on national, rules-based fiscal frameworks to achieve the desired 
degrees of fiscal discipline and stabilization. The underlying argument is sound. Since fiscal 
policy remains inextricably linked to national politics, legitimacy sits there, and centrally 
enforced fiscal rules may lack the local ownership required to effectively tie the hands of 
policymakers or at least encourage them to behave. Homegrown fiscal frameworks might be 
more legitimate and stand a better chance to productively constrain fiscal discretion. For this 
to work, national frameworks had to be consistent with EU-wide rules, and some 
coordination in their design and implementation had to take place. The necessary 
harmonization was codified in EU law through a 2011 Directive and a 2013 Regulation (part 
of the so-called “Two-Pack”) applying to euro area countries.2  
The present paper focuses on an intriguing dimension of those harmonized fiscal frameworks 
at the national level: the reliance on independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) to foster 
commitment to the rules (see Larch and Braendle, 2018; or Jankovics and Sherwood, 2017). 
                                                   
2 A 2013 intergovernmental treaty containing the so-called Fiscal Compact confirmed these provisions, 
expanding them to 3 non-euro members (Bulgaria, Denmark, and Romania).   
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The idea is to entrust “independent bodies” with monitoring compliance with national fiscal 
rules, advising on the activation of correction mechanisms and escape clauses associated with 
the rules, and producing or endorsing macroeconomic projections underlying the budget. 
Although EU law leaves ample room for interpretation as to the specific institutional format 
of these bodies, it seems clear that they echo the recent emergence of independent fiscal 
institutions (IFIs)—or “fiscal councils”—as part of leading international practice in the design 
of fiscal frameworks.3 
While the injunction to give a role to independent bodies in national fiscal frameworks follows 
a global trend (see Beetsma et al. 2018), the limited efforts to harmonize their roles, functions 
and institutional models, and the absence of explicit coordination mechanism in their 
operations are more surprising. Although this may reflect the legitimate concern that IFIs 
must espouse the country-specific contours of fiscal decision-making (OECD, 2014), it is 
equally legitimate to wonder whether their effectiveness in the EU—and even more so in the 
euro area—context would not call for some form of coordination. In the end, national fiscal 
frameworks—including IFIs—are supposed to contribute to improved fiscal policy 
coordination, a vital dimension of euro area stability (see e.g. Bergin, 2000; and Debrun, 
2000).  
In 2016, the creation of the European Fiscal Board (EFB), an EU-wide IFI nested in the 
Commission itself, was a first step in concretely acknowledging the need for coordination, at 
least vertically between the center and the national IFIs, if not horizontally, among IFIs. 
However, the initial intention expressed in the Five Presidents Report (Juncker et al., 2015) 
to task the EFB with the “coordination” of national IFIs raised serious concerns. The risk that 
IFIs could be perceived as agents of a central agenda was in direct contradiction with the 
national ownership that is critical to their role in shaping national public debates about fiscal 
issues. In the end, the EFB’s mandate includes a vague request to “cooperate” with national 
IFIs. However, the precise nature and form of such cooperation is yet to be fully fleshed out, 
although hard (or institutionalized) forms of coordination—that would imply joint decisions 
binding all IFIs—currently seem to be ruled out. 
Three questions guide our analysis of coordination issues among IFIs in the EU. First, how do 
national IFIs really influence fiscal policies? Second, given the public good dimension of fiscal 
soundness in the EU, what does the answer to the first question imply in terms of potential 
coordination failures? Third, to the extent that such failures raise meaningful concerns, how 
should coordination be organized? After reviewing the specific functions and impact of 
national IFIs, we discuss the case for coordination among IFIs in the EU and between them 
and the center. Doing so, we take the current architecture of fiscal governance as given and 
                                                   
3 A draft directive of December 2017 is unambiguous about the definition of independent bodies as good-
practice fiscal councils of the type codified by the OECD (2014). 
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ignore possibly superior, but certainly more ambitious, reforms of the central governance 
that might improve the effectiveness of EU rules (see e.g. Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2018).  
We conclude that the case for coordination exists at two levels. First, failing to support 
effective national IFIs in all countries would undermine a central underpinning of the 2010 
fiscal governance reform, which is that government commitments to national rules are 
stronger than commitments to EU rules. Second, there could be significant costs to allowing 
open conflicts between national IFIs and the center regarding the monitoring of fiscal rules, 
the assessment of the forecasts underlying national budgets, and the existence of 
circumstances warranting either a correction of past budgetary slippages or the activation of 
escape clauses. The same concern applies to the normative assessments made by certain 
fiscal councils if they collide with the country-specific recommendations adopted by the 
European Council (under recommendation of the Commission) at the end of the European 
semester. Finally, the center’s views on the desirable euro area fiscal stance may also create 
tensions with IFIs’ assessments at the national level. 
In the current setup, the EFB can only partly mitigate these risks. We discuss options along 
the trade-off between preserving national ownership and IFIs’ independence on the one 
hand, and the avoidance of public conflicts on fiscal oversight, recommendations and the 
aggregate fiscal stance on the other. In all cases, the EFB could play a key role in ensuring a 
regular flow of relevant information between national IFIs and EU institutions.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the typical functions 
of IFIs and discusses how they can potentially influence policy outcomes. This paves the way 
for Section III which focuses on IFIs in the euro area and assesses the costs of potential 
coordination failures. Section IV explores broad options to better coordinate IFIs activities 
without impinging on national ownership. 
 
II.   INDEPENDENT FISCAL COUNCILS: RATIONALE AND FUNCTIONS  
A.   Constraining Discretion and the Rise of IFIs 
Four decades after Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) seminal insights, the rules vs. discretion 
debate has converged on a broad consensus that even though strict rules-based policymaking 
is in most cases impractical, policymakers’ discretion ought to be constrained.4 One key 
reason is that pure discretion allows policymakers to overexploit macroeconomic policy 
instruments to extract short-lived gains, destroying the credibility of commitments to optimal 
policies (Barro and Gordon, 1983). Excessive inflation, large public deficits and procyclical 
fiscal policies invariably follow.  
                                                   
4 By discretion, we mean policymakers’ ability to optimally adjust their instruments to changing circumstances 
at any point in time. 
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Over the years, formal macroeconomic frameworks have been developed to tame those 
policy biases. The underlying idea is to provide policymakers with the right incentives to 
deliver on socially desirable policies. Because monetary and fiscal policies are strongly 
interconnected, it has also been increasingly recognized that such frameworks had to be 
envisaged in a holistic fashion, encompassing both monetary and fiscal instruments 
(Castellani and Debrun, 2005; Combes et al. 2018).  
Policy frameworks are typically made of two basic ingredients, rules and independent 
institutions, combined in varying proportions. After monetary rules proved ineffective in the 
face of volatile money demand, monetary policy was placed in the hands of politically 
independent central banks with a clear mandate to target inflation. Accountable central 
bankers are constrained by the need to deliver on their mandate or face consequences; and 
today, formal rules play virtually no role in the conduct of monetary policy.  
On the fiscal side, rules—in the form of numerical caps on relevant fiscal indicators—have 
remained the dominant approach to constrain discretion. The delegation of fiscal instruments 
to unelected officials remains anathema, if only because a budget is the financial translation 
of a political platform that elected policymakers are legitimately expected to implement. 
From a normative point of view, the primarily distributive nature of fiscal policy and the lack 
of consensus on the objectives it should pursue also preclude the delegation of fiscal 
instruments to unelected officials (see Alesina and Tabellini, 2007; and Calmfors and Wren-
Lewis, 2011). In recent years, however, independent institutions playing mainly an oversight 
role have emerged to foster policymakers’ commitment to fiscal policy rules. 
The OECD (2014) defines independent fiscal institutions as “publicly funded, independent 
bodies under the statutory authority of the executive or the legislature which provide non-
partisan oversight and analysis of, and in some cases advice on, fiscal policy and 
performance.” Thus, unlike early academic proposals (surveyed in Debrun et al., 2009), real-
world IFIs do not exert any formal authority over fiscal policy. Their role is only to inform, 
analyze, and possibly also advise.5 
With the notable exceptions of Austria (1970), the Netherlands (1945), and the United States 
(1974), the rise of IFIs is a recent phenomenon. Most of them were created after the 2008 
global financial crisis (Figure 1). Interest in IFIs largely stems from the mixed experience with 
fiscal rules as an effective mean of achieving sound policies and the post-crisis efforts by 
governments to strengthen commitments to sustainable public finances. It is, however, 
notable that most existing IFIs identified by the IMF at end-2016 were in the EU, pointing to 
the role of external incentives such as fiscal reforms agreed in the context of bailout packages 
                                                   
5 The jury is still out on the desirability of any advisory function because it can bring the council dangerously 
close to the political fray. 
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(e.g. Hungary, Portugal and Ireland) or the need to comply with the new common 
requirements for national fiscal frameworks.   
Figure 1. Number of Independent Fiscal Councils in the World (end-2016) 
Source: IMF Fiscal Councils Dataset (2017). 
The mandate of IFIs, their institutional format, and the tasks they perform vary greatly across 
countries, reflecting the idiosyncrasies of national budget processes, history and political 
customs. However, all IFIs ultimately strive to provide objective information and adequate 
incentives to elected policymakers, to those they account to (voters), and to all other 
stakeholders in a country’s public finances, including international or supranational 
institutions with a surveillance mandate, and of course, investors.  
A natural question is how an institution that does not control any fiscal lever could constrain 
policy discretion and encourage better fiscal outcomes. The emerging consensus is that the 
effectiveness of IFIs rests on their ability to enhance fiscal transparency. By publicly providing 
objective information on the state of public finances, the effects of current and announced 
policies, or potential deviations from prior commitments, an IFI can raise the reputational 
costs of unsound policies, untenable promises, and attempts to creatively embellish public 
accounts or hide policy mistakes. Better-informed voters can more effectively reward sound 
policies and sanction bad ones, whereas market participants can form a more accurate view 
of a sovereign’s creditworthiness and price it accordingly. That said, the specific channels 
through which IFIs can potentially influence policy outcomes remain relatively diffuse, and 
therefore hard to theorize or to identify statistically (see Beetsma et al. 2017, 2018). 
Beyond bolstering market discipline and democratic accountability, IFIs can also play a useful 
role in the budget process by enabling checks and balances within the political system. For 
instance, an IFI providing objective and credible information on the state of the economy and 
expected tax revenues can facilitate the centralization of budget requests from line 
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ministries, mitigating pressures to produce optimistic revenue forecasts that could 
accommodate politically tempting spending requests. In a context where fiscal rules serve as 
a reference for budget preparation, independent views on key parameters of a rule, such as 
the structural budget balance, the need to correct past slippages or the existence of 
conditions requiring the activation of an escape clause can only help a proper implementation 
of the rule. 
That said, the transparency-reputation-market-discipline nexus at the root of IFIs’ 
effectiveness should not be viewed as a panacea against unsound fiscal policies. First, the 
political context matters a great deal when it comes to the impact of fiscal transparency on 
policy choices. For instance, if the likelihood of winning an election is primarily shaped by 
other factors than policymakers’ competence in managing public finances, transparency 
could actually encourage financially irresponsible initiatives targeted at winning votes to 
offset the adverse effect of revealed competence issues (Beetsma et al. 2017). Second, the 
mapping between the many possible sources of deficit bias and the typical tasks and roles of 
IFIs is far from clear-cut and remains open to discussion (Calmfors and Wren-Lewis, 2011). 
Third, as the explosion of social media suggests, information overload can be as damaging 
the lack of information. Government budgets are already subject to many different formal 
and informal “independent” assessments and the voice of an IFI might just be viewed as 
adding to the noise rather than distilling an audible signal.  
 
B.   What Do IFIs Do?  
The remit of IFIs often reflects the specific circumstances in which they were born. For 
instance, the establishment of the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) was part of an effort 
by the legislative branch to reclaim its constitutional control over the public purse, a control 
that had been gradually eroded by a better-informed executive. This explains why two core 
functions of the CBO are to provide a non-partisan costing of draft laws and to assess the 
sustainability of public finances through long-term projections. In the United Kingdom, the 
delegation of forecasts to the Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR) followed years of 
optimistic forecasts in a context of weak commitment to a fiscal rule.  
 
In the EU, even though not all officially recognized independent bodies are fiscal councils in 
the sense defined above,6 IFIs’ mandates are well aligned on EU law requirements. 
Specifically, all 23 EU countries with at least one fiscal council as of end-2016 have mandated 
such an institution to monitor the implementation of fiscal rules. Most member states (20) 
have also tasked a fiscal council to assess the quality of official forecasts used in budget 
preparation, whereas an IFI directly contributes to the forecasting rounds in 8 countries. 
                                                   
6 In the list provided by Jankovicz and Sherwood (2017), only 6 independent bodies in 5 different countries are 
not reported as IFIs in the 2017 vintage of the IMF Fiscal Council Dataset; and only one of those countries has 
no recognized IFI.  
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However, according to the IMF, only 3 countries have either an obligation or a consistent 
practice to use IFI’s own forecasts in elaborating their budget. Interestingly, two thirds of the 
member states allow or request the IFI to make normative analyses, including specific 
recommendations, a greater proportion than among non-EU IFIs. Last but not least, IFIs 
prepare long-term fiscal sustainability assessments in about three quarters of EU members 
with such an institution.  
 
 Figure 2. Remit of IFIs in the European Union  
Note: Numbers expressed in percent of countries with at least one IFI. 
Source: IMF Fiscal Councils Dataset (2017). 
 
C.   IFIs Effectiveness: The Central Role of the Public Debate 
As mentioned earlier, there is still preciously little evidence on the effectiveness of IFIs. In 
addition to having too few observations to establish robust statistical linkages, the 
transmission channels from the activities of an IFI to policy outcomes are multiple and diffuse. 
The existing evidence is nevertheless encouraging in the sense that conditional correlations 
have the “right sign.” For instance, Beetsma et al. (2018) use panel regressions to suggest 
that the presence of an IFI has a beneficial impact on the accuracy of fiscal forecasts—
although not on macroeconomic forecasts, confirming early insights from Debrun and Kinda 
(2017)—as well as on compliance with fiscal rules.   
Another empirical approach explored by Debrun et al. (2017) is to assess the media impact 
of fiscal councils’ activities and then to check whether a greater impact can be systematically 
connected to fiscal performance. Focusing on a small number of long-standing and well-
established IFIs, they conclude that while IFIs tend to be present in the media at times when 
they should indeed be communicating—e.g. in case of significant budgetary slippages—an 
9 
 
 
adequate media presence does not appear to materially affect subsequent fiscal outcomes. 
In the EU, a large majority of IFIs consider that their potential influence on the budget process 
operates through a strong media presence (Figure 3). This capacity to shape the public debate 
on fiscal policy is important given that EU fiscal councils often lack other formal avenues to 
influence policymakers, such as effective “comply or explain” mechanisms.    
Figure 3. Channels of Influence of EU Fiscal Councils on the Budget 
Note: Numbers expressed in percent of the number of IFIs. 
Source: IMF Fiscal Councils Dataset (2017). 
Economists and practitioners agree that a strong presence in the public debate is 
instrumental for IFIs’ effectiveness. On the theoretical side, Beetsma et al. (2017) show how 
IFIs’ ability to send clear and objective signals on the state of public finances and the adequacy 
of fiscal policy can mitigate conventional sources of deficit bias by enabling voters to 
distinguish between good and bad policies. This encourages any incumbent concerned with 
re-election to behave, and voters to select more competent policymakers on average.  
On the practical side, developing an effective communication strategy has been an early 
concern in the growing community of independent fiscal institutions.7 In a world already 
flooded with information and commentaries of all kinds, the golden rule for good IFI 
communication is to boost the “signal-to-noise ratio”. This means that they should talk only 
when they must, and on topics for which they can claim to be a reliable, independent source. 
Thus, maximizing the signal-to-noise ratio implies that timely, focused, and impactful 
engagement with the public should be preferred to frequent interventions about everything 
possibly related to the government budget (Debrun et al. 2013).   
                                                   
7 See for instance Sunshine (2018). 
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A legitimate question is whether all fiscal councils have been equally successful in influencing 
the public debate. As mentioned earlier, IFIs form a highly heterogenous group with varying 
degrees of operational independence and capacities, and one would expect that patterns of 
engagement with the public on fiscal issues could vary substantially from one institution to 
the other.  
As a simple, comparable metric for an IFI’s influence on the national public debate, we 
analyze data on the number of Google searches for 3 well-established IFIs generally 
recognized as being close to international leading practice: the Office for Budget 
Responsibility (or OBR, United Kingdom), the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis (better known under its Dutch acronym of CPB), and the Independent Authority for 
Fiscal Responsibility (or AIReF in Spain). These three councils are also sufficiently different in 
their mandates, activities and history to exhibit a priori distinct patterns in their cyber 
presence. The data capture Google searches originating in each individual country either 
spelling out the IFI’s name in the country’s language, in English, or using its conventional 
acronym (whichever yielded the most meaningful time series). All the series show the number 
of hits as a percentage of the maximum reached over the period under consideration. 
The data for the OBR, which covers the last 5 years of weekly Google hits, suggests a highly 
focused communication stirring public interest right around the critical times of the budget 
process (Figure 4). The top panel exhibits marked spikes around the autumn (November, 
identified by a diamond) and spring (March, identified by a triangle) budget statements. Since 
2017, all the measures and draft legislations for the yearly cycle are announced in a single 
package during the autumn statement only, which helps explain why the diamonds have since 
then peaked much higher than the triangles. Finally, the dots identify much more modest 
spikes corresponding to the publication of OBR’s sustainability analysis and fiscal risk 
statements (both in July).8  
The bottom panel of Figure 4 corroborates the impression that the public interest in the OBR 
occurs at times when the issue of government deficits (search item: “government budget 
balance”) also seems to get a lot of attention from internet users. However, the OBR’s 
carefully planned communication also means that it does not seem to opportunistically 
intervene (or at least generate public interest) each time the issue of government budget 
balances somehow “makes the buzz.” 
  
                                                   
8 The July 2015 yellow spike is more pronounced, probably reflecting the supplementary budget introduced at 
that time. 
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Figure 4. Internet Presence of the OBR in Google Searches (weekly, 2014-2018) 
A. Search for “Office for Budget Responsibility” in the United Kingdom 
B. Search for “Government budget balance” 
Note: Numbers expressed in percent of the maximum number of Google hits over the period. 
Source: Google Trend (February, 2019). 
The case of the Dutch CPB would seem a priori less clear cut (Figure 5, top panel). However, 
the time series exhibits a very high volatility inherent to the CPB much-publicized costing of 
electoral platforms ahead of general elections. As the CBP has operated since the mid-1940s, 
we retrieved the longest time series of Google searches available (monthly data going back 
to 2004). Very sharp peaks in internet users’ interest for the CPB systematically occur the 
month preceding general elections—when the report “Charted Choices” is published and 
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identified on the Figure by a diamond—and the month of the elections—identified by a 
triangle. Given the dimension in which Google presents the data (in percent of the maximum 
observed over the entire sample), these peaks dramatically compress the rest of the series. 
However, aggregating monthly outcomes over the 15 years available points to a stable 
seasonal pattern in which the higher number of hits observed in March and September of 
each year coincides with the CPB’s main forecast releases (Figure 5, bottom left panel).   
 
One last observation about the Google metric of CPB’s cyber presence is a pronounced 
downward trend, particularly after 2013. Even the spike generated by the 2017 elections did 
not bring Google searches above the level recorded in any year between 2004 and 2013. 
While such erosion could be due to multiple factors, including the fact that the CPB may have 
built a growing cohort of regular users who do not need to search for its website, it suggests 
that IFIs’ presence in the public debate should not be taken for granted and needs to be 
nurtured. 
 
Unlike the CPB, the AIReF is a rather new institution that had to quickly step up to a broad 
mandate, including the surveillance of Spain’s complex web of subnational governments. And 
unlike the OBR, the AIReF is mandated to publish a large and varied portfolio of reports falling 
into no less than 11 different categories.9 These features may explain the fairly fickle pattern 
of AIReF cyber presence displayed in Figure 6.  
The risk associated with high frequency interventions in the public debate is that information 
overload can erode the signal-to-noise ratio of IFI communication. For instance, Curristine et 
al. (2013, p. 36) warn that “[…] a fiscal council constantly out in the public with a running 
commentary, disconnected from important parliamentary budget preparation deadlines 
would raise doubts about its ability to contribute to the debate, when it is most needed.” Such 
risk seems unlikely to have materialized for AIReF, however. The Google metric for internet 
users’ interest has steadily risen, doubling since AIReF’s creation (according to the 6-month 
moving average of the indicator). This may suggest that AIReF outputs (and the way it 
communicates about them) make its interventions in the public debate sufficiently distinct to 
dispel the impression of a “running commentary” and to attract more attention over time.    
  
                                                   
9 These include: Opinions, Studies, Spending Reviews, Recommendations, Working Papers, Occasional Papers, 
Speeches by the President, Annual Report and Strategic Plan, Minutes, Resolutions, and Focus. 
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Figure 5. Internet Presence of the CPB in Google Searches (monthly, 2004-2018) 
A. Search for “Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis” in the Netherlands 
B. Monthly pattern C. Yearly average 
 
Note: Numbers expressed in percent of the maximum number of Google searches over the period.  
Source: Google Trend (February, 2019). 
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Figure 6. Internet Presence of the AIReF in Google Searches (weekly, 2014-2018) 
Note: Numbers expressed in percent of the maximum number of Google hits over the period.  
Source: Google Trend (February, 2019). 
D.   Summary 
The ultimate goal of IFIs is to strengthen governments’ commitment to fiscal responsibility, 
which, in the EU, is enshrined in formal fiscal policy rules.10 To do so, IFIs perform a range of 
activities that raise the costs for governments to breach those rules. Tasks include providing 
direct inputs to the budget process (e.g. unbiased macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts, 
estimates of structural balances, costing of certain legislative initiatives), public assessments 
of fiscal performance (including a formal monitoring of compliance with fiscal rules,  
evaluations of the likelihood to reach official goals with announced policies, or assessment of 
long-term sustainability), and other non-partisan inputs to the public debate about fiscal 
policy (including sometimes specific policy recommendations to deliver on official objectives).  
 
In the end, as fiscal councils do not control any policy lever and often do not benefit from 
direct involvement in decision-making, their influence on the public debate is paramount to 
affect policy outcomes. If they can be ignored at no cost for the government, chances are that 
they will be ignored and hopelessly ineffective. Although IFIs’ realm is by essence as local as 
fiscal politics, EU membership gives a transnational dimension to their activities, raising the 
risk of costly coordination failures. The next section discusses these potential failures, 
building a case for some form of EU-wide coordination among IFIs.  
  
                                                   
10 Note that coexistence of rules and IFIs is a global norm, not just an EU-specific phenomenon (Debrun and 
Kinda, 2017).  
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III.   IFIS IN THE EU CONTEXT: COOPERATION VS. COORDINATION 
In the EU, IFIs’ success in fostering political commitment to harmonized rules-based 
frameworks has a public good dimension. The argument is especially relevant in the euro 
area, where the stability of the common currency requires sustainable and stabilizing fiscal 
policies in every single member state. It is important to recall at the outset of this section that 
we use the term coordination in a broad sense that includes “soft” forms of voluntary 
cooperation such as regular exchanges of views. 
 
Two broad types of coordination failures could undermine the effectiveness of fiscal policy 
oversight by national IFIs and the Commission. The first is an insufficient harmonization of 
IFIs’ objectives, functions and capacities across countries. A system where only a fraction of 
IFIs perform as intended would negate the public good dimension of effective national 
frameworks at the EU level. The second type of coordination failure would take the form of 
recurrent, meaningful, and, by definition, public disagreements between the Commission and 
local IFIs. Such cacophony would not only weaken the signaling power of IFI communication, 
but also undermine the Commission’s role in implementing the Stability and Growth Pact and 
orchestrating fiscal coordination in the context of the European Semester, notably through 
country-specific recommendations.  
 
A.   Insufficient IFI Harmonization 
Achieving some convergence among national IFIs towards best international practice would 
be desirable for all. The Commission would appreciate stronger national commitments to EU-
compatible fiscal frameworks, and IFIs would gain broad acceptance and credibility more 
quickly, which is particularly valuable for new institutions.  
 
However, there are signs that harmonization may be too low. The 2011 Directive and the 
Two-Pack only mandated some key elements of independent bodies’ remits but failed to flesh 
out even the most basic elements of best practice in designing and operating IFIs, including 
guarantees of non-partisanship and independence, access to information, ringfenced 
funding, and staffing commensurate to tasks (see von Trapp and Nicol, 2018). A draft 
Directive of December 2017 “for strengthening fiscal responsibility” comes across as an 
official acknowledgement that more could indeed be done to bring every “independent 
body” closer to a best practice IFI (see Art. 3, par. 7). However, at the time of writing, there 
appears to be no political appetite for the draft Directive.  
 
Despite the convergence in remits sought through EU law, the EFB (2018) recently observed 
that capacities to deliver may vary significantly across countries. Horvath (2017) documents 
the great heterogeneity among EU IFIs in key dimensions usually thought to shape their 
effectiveness. While local constraints and preferences can partly explain such 
heterogeneity—a healthy manifestation of national ownership—they cannot explain it all. A 
cursory look at the data suggests that several recurring issues could undermine IFIs’ 
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effectiveness, including insufficient capacities (funding and staff), gaps in guaranteed access 
to information, and a lack of formal avenues for engagement with policymakers (executive of 
legislature).  
 
As illustrated in Figure 7 (panel A), the median staff size (including management) of an IFI in 
the EU does not exceed 12 full-time equivalents, with the largest numbers explained by 
historically broad mandates in some of the older institutions in the Netherlands, Denmark, 
and Belgium. De jure guarantees on access to relevant information—consisting of a 
memorandum of understanding backed by specific legal provisions—are also lacking in many 
countries. Specifically, 5 countries have no guarantee at all (score 0 in Figure 7-panel B), 4 
rely on a memorandum only (score 1), and 5 benefit from legal safeguards but have no 
specific memorandum in place to flesh out the legal provision (score 2). Finally, a third of EU 
IFIs cannot count on any structured channel of engagement with policymakers, such as an 
effective comply-or-explain provision11 and regular hearings, while both mechanisms are 
simultaneously available to only a quarter of them (Figure 7, panel C).  
 
 
B.   Cacophony 
The limitations on direct means of political traction for IFIs put a premium on their ability to 
shape the public debate through strong media presence and effective communication. This 
is precisely where the second type of coordination failure can arise because the European 
Commission and each national IFI share the responsibility to oversee national fiscal policies.  
 
Any oversight function involves a significant dose of judgment and uncertainty, making 
divergences of views beyond honest disagreements among independent experts quite likely. 
Indeed, the Commission and local fiscal councils work with different information sets, and 
fulfill specific mandates giving them different perspectives on political objectives and 
constraints facing national policymakers. Unlike national IFIs, the Commission is the core 
player in annual policy coordination in the context of the European Semester, not to mention 
the enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact, whose provisions are reflected in one way 
or another in national fiscal rules. Thus, compared to a local institution, the Commission 
might pay greater attention to Union-wide considerations such as the euro area fiscal stance 
and its impact on the area’s balance of payments, the exchange rate of the euro, and 
ultimately, its possible repercussions of the common monetary policy.  
  
                                                   
11 Jankovics and Sherwood (2017) offer a somewhat more benign view on comply-or-explain practices than 
ours, which rely on IMF data. See also EFB (2017). 
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Figure 7. EU Fiscal Councils: Same Expectations, Heterogeneous Means 
A. Staff resources (number of FTE, including management) 
B. Guarantees on access to information 
C. Structured engagement with policymakers 
Sources: OECD IFI Database (2018), IMF Fiscal Council Dataset (2017), and author’s calculation. 
Notes: In Panel B, a score of 1 indicates the existence of a memorandum of understanding only, a score of 2, a 
legal guarantee but without such memorandum, and a score of 3, a memorandum backed by legislative 
guarantee. In panel C, the figure shows the percentage of EU IFIs benefitting from formal consultations with 
policymakers (“Form. Cons.”), a comply-or-explain requirement (“Compl./Expl.”), and a combination of the 
latter two (“Both”). 
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Diverging views between a fiscal council and the Commission on the adequacy of fiscal policy 
could create undesirable cacophony in national public debates, possibly undermining the 
credibility of both institutions and jeopardizing the implementation of fiscal rules. For 
national IFIs, cacophony could blur the public signals they rely on to influence policy 
outcomes. Certain conflicts could carry the suspicion that the IFI is either an agent of Brussels 
or a loyal subject of its sovereign (i.e. under local political influence). Either way, its 
independence would be questioned. For the Commission, recurrent public disputes with IFIs 
could weaken its traction at the national level, working against the initial intent to increase 
EU rules ownership through EU-friendly national frameworks.  
 
Several sensitive areas can easily be anticipated as possible battlegrounds. First, cacophony 
could arise from diverging assessments of the quality of macroeconomic and budgetary 
forecasts, notably if the Commission and the fiscal council do not communicate in synch 
and/or use divergent methodologies. Particularly damaging would be a situation where the 
forecasts produced by an IFI and used by the government would be deemed overoptimistic 
by the Commission. Second, different perspectives on policymakers’ incentives and binding 
constraints could feed differences in assessing the need, magnitude and timing of activating 
correction mechanism, escape clauses, or invoking “other relevant factors” in case of 
significant deviation from agreed objectives. Again, this could not only loosen the link 
between the EU rules and their national counterpart, but also undermine IFIs independence 
by subjecting them to a form of comply-or-explain relationship with the Commission. Third, 
conflicts could arise in the context of the policy recommendations emanating from the 
European Semester annual policy coordination exercise. They could be particularly damaging 
for national IFIs mandated to formulate normative assessments and recommendations. Once 
again, divergences in available information and different emphasis—e.g. a greater role for 
euro-area fiscal stance considerations on the side of the Commission—could put IFIs and the 
Commission on a collision course. 
 
Now, it bears emphasizing that “cacophony” in this context means preventable noise 
stemming from different information, methodologies or communication strategies, not 
substantiated disagreements emanating from different preferences, degrees of risk-aversion, 
or other factors shaping one’s judgment. The political nature of the Commission/Council 
tandem has the potential to create divergences with independent institutions at the national 
level; and IFIs—including the EFB—should be expected to disagree from time to time with 
national and supranational political bodies. In the end, the idea is to avoid conflicts that 
obfuscate the public debate and weaken democratic accountability, not those that are 
inherent to rich and well-informed discussions about fiscal issues.12 
 
                                                   
12 I am grateful to Cinzia Alcidi for encouraging me to clarify this point. 
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C.   Evidence 
While conceptually plausible, there is only anecdotal evidence about the concrete relevance 
of these coordination issues, and the extent to which they can undermine the role of IFIs in 
EU fiscal governance. On the lack of harmonized practice, the EFB (2018) noted significant 
differences in the remit and constraints faced by IFIs in critical areas such as the preparation 
of macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts, the timing and coverage of IFI assessments, and 
their access to information. This results in varying levels of IFI activity, with certain institutions 
remaining largely silent regarding the implementation of fiscal rules and the related 
compliance risks, while others are more vocal, although not necessarily effective. 
 
On the risk of cacophony, the EFB (2018) noted information asymmetries between the IFIs 
and the Commission and identified as a “coordination issue” the fact that IFIs were not 
directly involved in discussions between the Commission and national governments. Whether 
this would be desirable or even feasible is not the point. The fact is that conditions are in 
place for IFIs and the Commission to create unhelpful noise in the public debate. Jankovics 
and Sherwood (2017) provide one clear example of cacophony that could be symptomatic of 
more to come. In a November 2016 report, the Irish IFI had pointed out a risk of non-
compliance with the EU expenditure benchmark, only to be sternly reminded by the Finance 
Minister that the Commission had already deemed the expenditure plans in questions 
“broadly compliant with the SGP.”    
 
 
IV.   COORDINATION AND ITS FORMS 
The potential coordination failures discussed above are significant. Should they materialize 
on a regular basis, the EU would not draw the full potential of the 2010 reform of fiscal 
governance, and at the national level, many IFIs could be perceived as part of the noise 
around fiscal issues, with a clear risk to fall into irrelevance. This section first discusses 
desirable forms of coordination, noting that they involve a horizontal and vertical dimension. 
We then turn to a brief discussion as to how such coordination could be organized concretely.  
A.   Forms of Coordination 
Policy coordination can take many forms. At one end of the spectrum, decisions are explicitly 
centralized. At the other end, players exchange relevant information about their respective 
objectives and constraints based on a common understanding of spillovers and 
interdependencies, the hope being that cooler (and better-informed) heads prevail before a 
preventable conflict erupts. The choice for a specific coordination model is dictated by the 
trade-off between the intensity of spillovers (and/or scale economies associated with 
centralization) and the preferences of each player. For instance, monetary policy was 
centralized because the spillovers from misaligned exchange rates and egoistic monetary 
policies were too strong to be compatible with a single market; but tax policies, which are 
distributive by nature and close to national politics remained in national hands, subject to 
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more limited harmonization. Sometimes also, national sensitivities are so acute that policies 
that should be centralized by virtue of any rational economic argument remain hopelessly 
national: defense is a case in point. 
In the case of EU IFIs, the terms of the trade-off unambiguously call for soft forms of 
coordination. First, national anchorage is paramount. Effective IFIs must be as local as fiscal 
politics. At the same time, they must be fiercely independent to be credible and audible in 
the national public debate. Thus, perceived pandering to either national politics or the central 
agenda of EU institutions would be toxic for any IFI.  
Second, given the nature of the link between IFI activities and fiscal policy outcomes, conflict 
avoidance or mitigation can go a long way through soft forms of coordination, including 
regular and structured information sharing, benchmarking (e.g. in terms of distance from best 
practice), and peer pressure. Because a central function of IFIs is to shape the public debate 
on fiscal issues, substantiated disagreements are inherent to any debate, and coordination 
should not mean suppressing disagreements altogether. The bottom line is that mitigating 
coordination failures could be done by establishing explicit channels of information 
exchanges and by forging a consensus on aspects of international best practice that EU IFIs 
should aim at.  
Two dimensions of coordination are relevant and should be made mutually consistent. First, 
information should flow vertically between each national fiscal council and the Commission, 
to the benefit of both institutions. Unless obvious confidentiality issues arise—such as for 
certain micro-simulations models of tax revenues or market-sensitive material on debt 
management strategies—all information deemed relevant for effective fiscal oversight 
should be shared. Preventing major informational asymmetries between the two institutions 
is indeed essential to reduce the risk of cacophony.13 Bilateral memorandums of 
understanding could govern the timing and contents of such regularly scheduled exchanges. 
Lower-frequency and more ad-hoc dialogue on methodologies and approaches could also be 
organized to further reduce the risk of cacophony. For instance, the Commission could clarify 
how it implements surveillance of the country in the context of the fiscal governance 
framework, whereas the Commission’s own oversight work could benefit from the council’s 
deeper knowledge of local constraints, customized statistical methodologies, and 
institutional specificities.  
Second, information should flow horizontally among IFIs. With many new institutions taking 
on key responsibilities in a complex governance system, there are obvious benefits to 
disseminating good working practices both as regards internal processes as well as the 
interactions with key stakeholders (i.e. the national government, the Commission, the 
general public, investors,…). Absent a centralized effort to further harmonize the role of IFIs, 
                                                   
13 One would presume that the Irish example of cacophony mentioned earlier could have been avoided had an 
open discussion about the expenditure benchmark taken place between the IFI and the Commission staff. 
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a network gathering all officially recognized independent bodies could offer a formal forum 
for such exchanges, and beyond that, a venue for sui generis peer pressure (emulation) and 
for benchmarking good practice in the specific context of EU (Calmfors and Wren-Lewis, 
2011).  
The overall consistency of the system would require regular dialogue between IFIs as a group 
and the Commission. This is where the EFB could facilitate coordination, acting as a neutral 
umpire to organize regular engagement with the Commission. Through these interactions, 
IFIs could provide first-hand, granular advice on ways to plug eventual gaps in the national 
leg of the fiscal governance framework, including the possible need for centrally-driven 
harmonization of IFIs’ remits, operational independence (including resources), and modes of 
engagement with national governments. Beyond suggesting institutional reforms, the group 
could also share common problems encountered in the implementation of budgetary 
surveillance and bring it to the Commission’s attention. 
That said, there is only so much dialogue, information sharing, and peer pressure can do. One 
specific area that may call for somewhat “harder” forms of coordination concerns formal 
recommendations to national governments. Not all IFIs issue such recommendations and 
they may not necessarily overlap with those prepared in the context of the European 
Semester. However, it is not hard to imagine that conflicting or sufficiently differentiated 
recommendations to national governments could weaken their traction on policymakers. 
Given the rather low take-up of recommendations issued at the end of the European 
Semester (Darvas and Leandro, 2015) and the need for many new IFIs to establish credibility, 
avoiding ex-ante divergences on recommendations would seem particularly important. This 
may require the IFI and the Commission to agree ex-ante on a division of labor in the 
formulation of such recommendations or on a rule specifying the circumstances in which one 
institution must align its fiscal recommendations on the other. Of course, should the Council 
ultimately choose not to follow the agreed recommendations submitted by the Commission, 
conflict could still arise, but its genesis would be transparently political. 
To conclude, Table 1 disaggregates coordination issues by task typically assigned to IFIs. As 
their remit can vary depending on the source of deficit bias they are expected to tackle, the 
extent and nature of the vertical dialogue with the Commission would have to be tailored to 
each country. 
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Table 1. IFI Coordination in the EU: A Granular View 
Cause of deficit bias Task of IFI Coord. failure Goal of coordination Form of coordination  
Growth optimism Make/assess forecasts Low capacities 
Cacophony 
Funding guarantees 
Sharing information (data, models, etc) 
Centralized (Directive?) 
Vertical dialogue 
Uncertain competence Oversight/analysis 
Recommendations 
 
Cacophony 
Different from 
Semester 
Explain judgments. 
Converge (division of labor) 
Vertical dialogue 
Vertical negotiation 
Fiscal illusion Sustainability analysis Low capacities 
No engagement 
Cacophony 
Funding guarantees 
Effective comply/explain; hearings 
Sharing information (data, models, etc) 
Centralized (Directive?) 
Horizontal dialogue (peer pressure) 
Vertical dialogue  
Impatience/electoral 
uncertainty 
Oversight/analysis 
Recommendations 
Cacophony 
Different from 
Semester 
Explain judgment 
Converge (division of labor) 
Vertical dialogue 
Vertical negotiation 
Common-pool/budget 
 Centralization 
Oversight/analysis Cacophony Converge on fiscal space assessment. Vertical dialogue 
 
B.   Status Quo and Way Forward 
Some elements of the cooperative system envisaged above are already in place, at least in 
embryonic form. As regards horizontal coordination, the idea of creating a platform for 
regular exchange of views and forging common views on joint areas of concern has already 
materialized. In fact, two overlapping networks exist. The EU network of Independent Fiscal 
Institutions was created by a signed agreement in September 2015. It is voluntary, self-
organized and open to all IFIs operating in the EU. The Network usefully pools analytical 
capacities from its members to produce short pieces that include (i) an analysis as to how IFIs 
perform some of their tasks (e.g. forecast endorsement), (ii) advice on further reforms of EU 
fiscal governance, and (iii) a position on the minimum standards IFIs should follow to be 
effective.  
A separate network gathers the officially recognized independent bodies by virtue of EU law. 
It has been in place since 2013 and operates under the aegis of the European Commission, 
with DG ECFIN acting “as a kind of secretariat.” (Jankovics and Sherwood, 2017). That second 
forum explicitly incorporates the vertical dimension of coordination as it provides a platform 
for IFIs and the Commission to engage on areas of common concern. 
The third and last element of the still embryonic cooperative system is the EFB which is 
vaguely mandated to cooperate with national IFIs. The EFB annual report does good on that 
mandate by providing an informative review of how IFIs play (or do not play) their expected 
role in EU fiscal governance. The report also identifies areas of concern regarding the 
effectiveness of IFIs, such as discrepancies in information sets available to the Commission 
and the IFIs and the lack of vertical dialogue between IFIs and the Commission. Finally, the 
EFB’s task to assess EC even-handedness in applying the EU framework could in principle 
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discourage the Commission to pander to local politics (“because this is France”), thereby 
directly reducing the risk of cacophony.  
While these initiatives signal awareness of the need for a more cooperative approach to the 
work of IFIs, the lack of coherence shows the difficulty to bring together generally new and 
untested institutions bound to be touchy on their independence. Most IFIs are 
understandably still very much focused on affirming independence from any political body, 
be it a national government or the Commission itself. A distinct risk, however, is that 
whatever arrangement is in place today can take a life of its own and stay beyond its point of 
objective irrelevance. It thus seems important, if not urgent, to gather energies for the 
common good of building and maintaining strong IFIs that effectively support commitments 
to sound fiscal policies. 
Economic analysis has not much to say on the details of the transition towards a coherent 
and effective cooperative system. We would nevertheless suggest the following steps to 
facilitate the emergence of such a system: 
1. A genuine cooperative regime can only emerge and thrive if players are well identified 
and recognize each other as peers. Thus, an EU-wide agreement on what constitutes 
an independent fiscal institution is a must. Today, some of the officially recognized 
independent bodies are not proper IFIs; and some well-established IFIs are not 
associated with the formal network aimed at bringing them together. 
2. A better alignment of the EFB on best-practice IFIs would greatly facilitate its role in 
fostering cooperation among IFIs and between them and the Commission. 
Independence cannot depend exclusively on the temporary appointment of highly 
talented management and staff, as these come and go. Expanded responsibilities 
coming along with a cooperative system would also call for reconsidering EFB limited 
resources, including staff size and permanent management appointments. Nesting 
the EFB in the Commission itself is also a clear departure from best practice. Ways to 
plug that gap include erecting the EFB is a stand-alone body or nesting it in a non- or 
less political institution.14  
3. To the extent that issues 1 and 2 can be solved, the architecture of the final system 
should be straightforward. First, a network of national fiscal councils (with mandatory 
participation of all IFIs recognized as such) would organize horizontal cooperation. 
Operationally, the existing EU network of IFIs has already established a significant 
track record and work practice that could usefully be built upon. Second, the 
revamped EFB could be the neutral umpire of the system, teaming up with national 
IFIs in their bilateral dialogue with the Commission, and enabling productive 
interactions between the network of national IFIs and the Commission. One could 
                                                   
14 Experience shows that the central bank or the audit court can be favorable habitats for IFIs. 
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think of many ways the EFB could be integrated to the network, but this is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
The sticking point remains the potential risk that any institutionalized network involved in 
structured interactions with EU political bodies could be perceived as a channel of influence 
of the supranational authority on national fiscal councils. Clearly, preserving IFIs’ 
independence is instrumental to ultimately boost national ownership of fiscal policy rules. 
Therefore, coordination can be a win-win strategy if two main conditions are met. First, as 
described above, coordination itself must not be designed to tie the hands of national IFIs. 
Second, placing the EFB in a neutral umpire position requires aligning its architecture on best 
international practice.   
Let us conclude by noting that the system sketched above is far more respectful of the 
subsidiarity principle than more ambitious proposals, such as the creation of an EU-wide fiscal 
council reporting directly to the European Parliament (Fatás and others, 2003). It is fully 
consistent with the goal of greater national ownership of fiscal rules, which is where the 
legitimacy of fiscal choices will ultimately sit for the foreseeable future. 
 
 
V.   CONCLUSION 
We looked at the international coordination issues related to the operation of independent 
fiscal councils in the EU fiscal governance framework. IFIs play a central role in the reformed 
fiscal governance because they are expected to foster commitment to national fiscal rules 
designed to be consistent with the supranational standards of fiscal discipline.  
Coordination issues arise because in a currency union, fiscal responsibility is a public good. 
Thus, IFIs should be effective everywhere, requiring harmonization in remits, tasks and 
capacities. Another important aspect relates to the nature of IFIs. These institutions influence 
policy outcomes mostly through their ability to better inform the public debate on fiscal 
policy. Hence, their activities overlap with regular surveillance conducted by the European 
Commission in the context of the European Semester and with the implementation of the 
Stability and Growth Pact.  
We argued that without coordination among national fiscal councils and between them and 
the center, two risks threaten the effectiveness of EU fiscal framework. First, some IFIs might 
fail to strengthen government’s commitments to national fiscal rules (and through them, EU 
standards of fiscal discipline). Second, the risk of cacophony would loom large in national 
public debates on the adequacy of fiscal policy, which IFIs should in principle avoid.  
Explicit coordination could mitigate such risk. Both the nature of potential coordination 
failures and the need to preserve national ownership and IFI independence suggests that 
coordination should take the form of structured exchanges of information and discussions, 
ideally with the support of a reformed EFB. By contrast, we see no case for “hard,” 
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institutionalized coordination aimed at muting ex-ante any divergence of views, as it would 
fatally undermine independence and national ownership of fiscal councils. 
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